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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 14–556, 14-562, 14-571 and 14–574

JAMES OBERGEFELL, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–556 v.
RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, ET AL.;
VALERIA TANCO, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–
562 v. BILL HASLAM, GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE,
ET AL.;
APRIL DEBOER, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–571 v.
RICK SNYDER, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, ET AL.; AND
GREGORY BOURKE, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–574 v. STEVE BESHEAR,
GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKY
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT
[June 26, 2015]

FRANKE, J., CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT
I join parts I through VI of Court’s opinion, concurring in the
judgment. I agree that the decision of the court below should be reversed,
and therefore I concur in the Court’s judgment, but write separately to clarify
that this matter should not be decided on fundamental rights grounds.
Further, I believe that the Court should provide more specific instructions to
the court below with respect to the appropriate remedy that should be
awarded in light of the equal protection remedy we find herein: the only
remedy that would be equality-enhancing overall would be one that
disestablished the institution of civil marriage altogether. It would then be
left to the states to devise a more equitable means by which to secure the
economic and legal interests of its citizens; one that does not rest on status
hierarchies that run afoul of fundamental values of equality and democracy.
We are urged by the petitioners in this case to usher in the next step in
the modernization of the institution of civil marriage. The petitioners,
sixteen people making up eight couples, contend that any distinction between
their partnerships and those now deemed eligible to marry in the states in
which they reside, turns on the consideration of factors rendered
constitutionally illegitimate for the purpose of public law-making. This
argument takes two principal forms: one based in the Equal Protection
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Clause, and another that suggests a substantive due process right to civil
marriage as a fundamental right.
I.
As a preliminary matter, I note that the relief sought by the petitioners
herein is neither radical nor sweeping, notwithstanding the alarm bells rung
by some amici. The claimants merely plea that their unions should be
legitimized through the grant of a civil marriage license on the same terms as
that afforded to different-sex couples. They insist that the same level of
commitment, decency, and stability reasonably characterizes their
partnerships as do the partnerships of different-sex couples that are granted
state licensure. Indeed, the facts alleged by the couples in the petitioner
class suggest a greater degree of commitment and stability than the majority
of different-sex couples who are not barred from a civil license for their union.
In important respects, the success of the petitioners in this case will subsidize
the underlying values of marriage more generally, insofar as the petitionercouples have embraced values of monogamy, financial interdependence,
loving and responsible parenthood, and dignity that make up the very fabric
of traditional notions of marriage. To the ways in which dignity underwrites
the celebrated status that marriage enjoys I shall return. The petitioners
herein have no aspirations to upend the institution of marriage, but rather
seek to prove their entitlement to the blessings, rights, and responsibilities
conferred by civil marriage on its current terms.
II.
The Court’s and the nation’s evolving sense of justice, protected in
many cases through a constitutional commitment to equality, has assigned
particular legal and social opprobrium to public policies or laws that manifest
or perpetuate ideologies of superiority and attendant inferiority. As the
CHIEF JUSTICE rightly notes, “Legislation must promote the public
interest, and may not be used merely to promote or disparage the private
interests of some group.”1 A mere desire to stigmatize or humiliate a
particular group cannot serve as a legitimate public justification for
lawmaking or public policy. See Windsor v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2675
(2013); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(concurring opinions); Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528,
534 (1973).
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This Court has a rich jurisprudence elaborating more than one way of
framing the guarantee of equality. One approach, preferred by the CHIEF
JUSTICE, analogizes the instant case to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) and United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S.
144, 152 & n.4 (1938), and sets out to determining whether sexual
orientation-based discrimination should be granted suspect class status akin
to race. Some scholars have described this as an “anticlassification”
approach and have critiqued it for the way in which it distracts the equality
analysis from underlying causes or effects of status hierarchies by focusing
attention instead on the wrong of legislative classification as a failure of
instrumental rationality. Reva Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination And
Anticlassification Values In Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 Harv.
L. Rev. 1470, 1503 (2004).
Yet another account interprets the values underlying the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equality guarantee as hostile to status hierarchies. This
perspective toward constitutional equality seeks to isolate and excise from
the domain of legitimate public action those “laws and practices that
aggravate [or perpetuate] the subordinate position of a specially
disadvantaged group.” Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5
Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 108, 157 (1976). This approach, often described as a
“group disadvantaging” principle, is vulnerable, however, to a critique that it
relies too heavily on social facts of disadvantage and their aggravation,
rather than the exposure of the logic underlying the regulation, a logic with a
basic structure of inferiority and superiority.
A separate line of cases treats the constitutional promise of equality as
something more ambitious and more substantive. In these cases the Court
has accepted the invitation to identify and then dismantle the ideologies or
forms of thinking that maintain status hierarchies. The Court’s infelicitous
evaluation of laws that single out a kind of status for negative legal
treatment has roots outside the context of the Equal Protection Clause. For
instance, in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), we held that rights
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment are in jeopardy when a mere status,
drug addition in that context, forms the basis of criminal punishment:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt
to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper,
or to be afflicted with a venereal disease. A State might determine that
the general health and welfare require that the victims of these and
other human afflictions be dealt with by compulsory treatment,
involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestration. But, in the light
of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal
offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be
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an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
370 U.S. at 666.
In cases raising sex discrimination claims under the Equal Protection
Clause brought to this Court in the last 40 years, we have repudiated the
embrace from an earlier era of the sex-based status hierarchy that lay at the
core of the separate spheres doctrine endorsed by the Court in Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872). See Reed v. Reed, 404 US 71 (1971);
Frontiero v Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976).
In the context of race-based equality the Court most unequivocally
adopted the antisubordination principle, calling out forms of power that
created and reinforced the formation of caste when it was mobilized through
invidious classification. For instance, in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967), the Court invalidated laws that prohibited white persons from
marrying non-white persons because, inter alia, such laws were “measures
designed to maintain White Supremacy.” Similarly, an ideology of racial
supremacy underwrote the essential wrong of laws segregating people on the
basis of their race in the context of public transportation, employment,
housing, or access to lunch counters. See e.g. Beckett v. School Bd. of City of
Norfolk, 308 F.Supp. 1274, 1304 (E.D. Va. 1969) rev’d on other grounds, 434
F.2d 408 (4th Cir. 1970)(attributing some forms of housing segregation “as
measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”). This approach
embodied the most effective repudiation of Chief Justice TANEY’s
endorsement of racial caste in Dred Scott v. Sanford:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race,
either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had
no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the
negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How) 343, 407 (1857).
This approach runs far deeper than a mere condemnation of racial
classifications, irrationality in the making of public policy, or violations of a
formalistic commitment to color-blindness. Rather, our constitution’s
commitment to equality should, and does, take aim at a particular form of
mischief beyond mere classification. A commitment to the equal protection of
the laws entails a suspicion with regard to the work that classification does
and the ways it collaborates with ideologies of supremacy through the notions
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of inferiority it puts into action. In this regard, the principle of inequality
that animates some of the Court’s modern equality jurisprudence concerns
itself especially with state policies and practices that create or legitimize a
badge of inferiority born by racial and other minorities. This badge operates
invidiously as a kind of warrant permitting, if not inviting, exclusion of,
derision toward, and second-class treatment of those subjects so insigned.
Under this account, when applied to the context of racial equality, the
Fourteenth Amendment embodies “a broad principle of practical equality for
the Negro race, inconsistent with any device that in fact relegates the Negro
race to a position of inferiority.” Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the
Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L.J. 421, 429-30 (1960).
The commitment underlying the equal protection clause in the racial
context, one that aims to invalidate public policies that enact or perpetuate
ideologies of inferiority, is equally salient in the case before us now. The
segregation of same-sex couples from the domain of civil marriage offends
fundamental principles of equality because these laws express and
implement an ideology of disgust, disdain, and antipathy towards lesbian and
gay people that renders same-sex partnerships categorically undeserving of
the recognition conferred on different-sex couples as a class. The N.A.A.C.P.
Legal Defense and Education Fund made a similar argument to this Court in
their briefing of the Loving v. Virginia case: “Actually, the laws against
interracial marriage grew out of the system of slavery and were based on race
prejudices and notions of Negro inferiority used to justify slavery, and later
segregation … [These laws] intrude a racist dogma into the private and
personal relationship of marriage.” Brief of N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae, Loving v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 1967 WL 113929 at 13, 14-15.
With particular relevance to the instant case, in a series of decisions
the Court has drawn sexual orientation-based discrimination within the
protective pickets of the Equal Protection Clause by framing the claimants’
equality claims as status-based injuries. Starting with Romer v. Evens, 517
U.S. 620 (1996), the Court has developed a jurisprudence of equality for
lesbian and gay people that identifies a status-based harm as the gravamen
of the constitutional wrong. “[Amendment 2] is a status-based classification
of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection
Clause does not permit.” 517 U.S. 620 at 635. “Respect for this principle
explains why laws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal
status or general hardships are rare. A law declaring that in general it shall
be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from
the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most
literal sense.” Id. at 633. At stake in this reading of the Equal Protection
Clause is the notion that status hierarchies undermine, indeed are anathema
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to, the very essence of democracy. “A State cannot so deem a class of persons
a stranger to its laws,” clarified Justice KENNEDY. Id. at 635. See also Jack
Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 Yale L.J. 2313 (1997).
The Court continued this line of reasoning in United States v. Windsor,
570 U.S. __ , 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013), wherein we invalidated a statute that
denied federal legal recognition to valid marriages between persons of the
same-sex by anchoring our Equal Protection analysis in the observation that,
“The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to
impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter
into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the
States.” 133 S.Ct. at 2693.
Overall, this line of cases can be understood to embrace something
more than an anticlassification principle of equality, preferring instead a
stance that can be understood as antisubordination in nature. See Siegal,
supra, at 1505. Given that the Court’s prior lesbian and gay equality cases
drew from an antisubordination account of equality I expect us to continue
that line of reasoning in the case before us now.
The antisubordination approach affords the Court the opportunity, or
better yet, requires that the Court unearth and expose the social meanings
expressed by the prohibition, and obliges the Court to describe “the status
relations enforced, and the status harms inflicted, by the prohibition” in
question.” Siegal, supra, at 1503. I prefer to approach the wrong raised by
the petitioners herein by recognizing how laws that ban civil licensure to
otherwise qualified same-sex couples convey a badge of inferiority toward
those couples on account of their homosexuality. In so doing, those laws
reinforce the caste supremacy of heterosexuality over homosexuality.
The ban on same-sex marriage is best understood as a measure
designed to maintain heterosexual supremacy and to inflict a badge of
inferiority on sexual minorities generally, and lesbians and gay men
particularly. This argument can be found in judicial findings and briefs as
the cause of marriage equality has moved its way toward us in lower courts,
likening the invidious wrong underlying the exclusion of same-sex couples
from the institution of civil marriage to the kind of ideological wrong named
by this Court in Loving. See e.g.: Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 268
(Ct.App.Md. 2007); In Re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal.4th 757, 834 (Cal. S.Ct.
2008). The plaintiffs in the 2001 Massachusetts challenge to the state’s ban
on same-sex civil marriage argued in the trial court: the ban on same-sex
marriage “reinforces a caste supremacy of heterosexuality over
homosexuality just as laws banning marriages across the color line exhibited
and reinforced white supremacy.” Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’
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Motion for Summary Judgment, Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, No. 01–
1647-A, Massachusetts Superior Court, Aug. 20, 2001. Similarly, Judge
Vaughn Walker, ruling in the case challenging California’s ban on same-sex
marriage enacted in Proposition 8, found that the marriage ban “conveys a
message of inferiority.” Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Pretrial Proceedings and
Trial Evidence Credibility Determinations Findings of Fact Conclusions of
Law Order, 704 F.Supp.2d 921, 974, 980 (N.D.Cal. 2010).
To be clear, the ideology of inferiority that underwrites the laws under
challenge in this action is not reserved for same-sex couples that seek to
marry. Rather, it enunciates a kind of hatred or disgust of lesbian and gay
men generally, whether or not they are in intimate partnerships or seek to
have those partnerships licensed by law. The ban on marriage for same-sex
couples is simply one institutional setting in which that ideology of disdain
gains the state’s endorsement. As our prior jurisprudence makes clear, the
embrace of this kind of subordinating dogma cannot serve as a legitimate
public justification for lawmaking or public policy. See Windsor v. United
States, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473
U.S. 432 (1985) (concurring opinions).
I concur in the CHIEF JUSTICE’s conclusion that laws categorically
barring otherwise qualified same-sex couples from eligibility for civil
marriage licenses are invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but I do not join his reasoning in so finding. I see no
need to examine the question of whether sexual-orientation based
classifications should receive the same elevated level of constitutional
scrutiny as classifications based on race, sex or other suspect or quasi-suspect
classes. Rather, in this case we can conclude that same-sex couples can
successfully challenge on equal protection grounds laws that categorically bar
them from civil marriage because such laws find their origin in and
perpetuate notions of heterosexual supremacy, designs that cannot form the
basis of a legitimate public purpose.
II.
As the CHIEF JUSTICE notes in Part VII of his opinion, petitioners
also argue that a ban on same-sex marriage violates a fundamental right to
marry, secured by the Due Process Clause. I do not join in the Court’s
fundamental rights analysis, first because I regard it as dicta given that the
Court had found sufficient grounds to invalidate the challenged laws on equal
protection grounds. Second, I part company with what I regard as slippage in
the CHIEF JUSTICE’s reasoning with respect to the fundamental nature of
civil marriage. Noting first that “we need not decide whether the states have
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a constitutional duty to create a special legal status called marriage”2 the
CHIEF JUSTICE then goes on to treat civil marriage “as if” it were
fundamental, building on stilts an argument with no foundation. The CHIEF
JUSTICE begins with a premise that transforms a contingent fact, “[a]ll of
the states have created such a status,” into a necessary one, all states must
do so because “[w]e therefore treat it as a fundamental interest.” The
question before us is not whether marriage is fundamental in a religious,
cultural, or historical sense but only whether the state’s civil licensure of
marriage is fundamental in a sense that is constitutional in nature. Without
denying the clear fact that many people consider marriage to be a distinctly
meaningful, if not sacred, form of intimate association that may entail the
blessings of clergy, family, and community, this Court has never held that the
constitution’s due process protections require that the state set up a civil
marriage regime to license those otherwise private vows.3
As this Court has acknowledged, “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life,” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74 (2003), but
this important constitutional principle imagines that liberty flourishes in the
absence of, not because of, state regulation, and does not require the state’s
involvement in sanctioning or licensing the forms that a good, meaningful or
sacred life might take.4 Unlike political rights such as voting, many of which
require the state’s facilitation in order for them to be meaningful, state
facilitation is in no way essential to the revered nature of private, intimate
vows of love and commitment. As is the case generally with the U.S.
Opinion for the Court at p. 10.
Cases cited by the petitioners and amici advancing the proposition that
there is a Due Process right to civil marriage are less conclusive than they
claim. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). These cases, taken as a whole,
do not establish a substantive due process right to civil licensure of marriage
in the absence of the illegitimate exclusion of one class of persons therefrom.
4 This is not to say that there aren’t other contexts where state facilitation is
essential to the fundamental right at issue. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the
Court rejected the claim of indigent women that the meaningful exercise of
fundamental rights secured in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), entailed assess to
public funding that would render those rights accessible for poor women. I believe
that Maher was wrongly decided, yet my view in this case does not contract my
position in Maher. In the case of poor women’s access to abortion, facilitation by the
state in the form of public funding is the only way to render the right secured in Roe
meaningful. In the absence of public funding, the right secured in Roe would be
completely meaningless for many poor or low income women. With marriage, by
contrast, state facilitation or licensure is incidental to a vow of love and commitment
that is essentially private in nature.
2
3

8

Constitution, civil liberties and rights tend to be negative in nature,
proscribing certain discriminatory or oppressive terms and conditions
imposed by the state on its citizens. It might be a better constitution if it
contained an array of positive in addition to negative rights but it would be a
markedly different one from the one we have.5
To be sure, once the state gets into the marriage business it must do so
on terms that conform to the requirements of the constitution, but this strong
imperative does not entail a constitutional duty placed on the state to license
marriages at all.6 For this reason, I would resist using this case as an
opportunity expand the substantive reach of the Due Process Clause to
include a fundamental right to marry.
III.
Finally, while I join the Court’s finding that the Equal Protection
Clause is offended by laws that limit the issuance of civil marriage licenses to
different-sex couples, I write separately to clarify our instructions to lower
courts on remand with respect to the remedy entailed by the constitutional
violation we find today.
Given that I would ground the Court’s holding in an equal protection
injury that focuses on the way the law reinforces the caste-based supremacy
of heterosexuality, the appropriate remedy for such a violation must pay heed
to the larger rights and interests of the full class of persons so harmed. As
such, the real parties in interest in this matter include homosexuals more
generally, not merely homosexuals who seek to marry, or same-sex couples
who seek to marry. Reverse engineering the ban on same-sex civil marriage
leads one back to a blueprint for homophobia more generally, and the
marriage ban is merely one element of that originary design.
The interests of this larger class of persons should inform our
consideration of the appropriate remedy in this case. Justice would not be
See Pamela S. Karlan, Let's Call The Whole Thing Off: Can States Abolish The
Institution Of Marriage?, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 697, 700 (2010).
6 “The ‘right to marry,’ is different from rights deemed ‘fundamental’ for
equal protection and due process purposes because the State could, in theory,
abolish all civil marriage while it cannot, for example, abolish all private
property rights.” Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309,
325 n. 14 (Mass SJC 2003)(citations omitted). See also: Cass Sunstein, The
Right to Marry, 26 Cardozo L.Rev. 2081, 2083–2084, (the right to marry
“comprises a right of access to the expressive and material benefits that the
state affords to the institution of marriage ... [and that] states may abolish
marriage without offending the Constitution.”) (italics omitted).
5
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done, nor would the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause be honored, if in
dismantling one status hierarchy we inextricably fortified another. Yet we
would do just that were we to simply order a remedy that same-sex couples
be permitted to gain civil marriage licenses on the same terms and conditions
as different-sex couples. This remedy would simultaneously dissolve one
status hierarchy within the gay community while assembling another,
privileging married gay people over unmarried gay people, and would
reinforce the supremacy of married people as a class.7
As society evolves in such a way as to recognize the claims of lesbians
and gay men to equality and dignity, marriage has persisted as the social,
legal and moral container for legitimacy and respectability. Surely the Court
is correct in finding that the statutory exclusion of same-sex couples from
civil marriage creates the kind of stigmatic harm that the Equal Protection
Clause was designed to prohibit. But in so finding we should be loath to
reinforce the legacy of laws and public values that disparage sexual relations
outside of marriage. The dignity enjoyed by same-sex couples who are now
eligible to marry should not be gained by reinforcing the stigma suffered by
adults who cannot or do not marry, or by children born to married parents.8
The cause of advancing the equal protection rights of same-sex couples should
not be bought at the expense of an equality norm that condemns marital
status discrimination. As one commentator has rightly noted, “[i]n a world in
which marriage is both a privileged status and a status of the privileged,
marriage equality that rests upon non-marriage’s ignominy risks reinforcing
the many other status inequalities that taint the legacy of marital
supremacy.” Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy And The Constitution Of
The Nonmarital Family, 103 Cal. L. Rev. 1277, 1283 (2015).

We have witnessed the amplification of this status hierarchy in several
states that have extended marriage rights to same-sex couples legislatively,
through state court litigation, or through popular referendum. In
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and
Vermont, extending civil marriage rights to same-sex couples was
accompanied by the statutory dissolution of other forms of family recognition
such as domestic partnerships or civil unions. See National Center for
Lesbian Rights, Summary of Laws Regarding Recognition of Relationships of
Same-Sex Couples, December 10, 2015, available at:
http://www.nclrights.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/Relationship_Recognition_State_Laws_Summary.pd
f. In these states marriage is granted a monopoly on licensing largely out of
concerns for distributional efficiency.
8 See e.g. Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, And
Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 345 (2011).
7
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For these reasons, the appropriate remedy for the Equal Protection
injury in this case would be the disestablishment of civil marriage altogether.
This remedy may strike some as a radical cure for the ill of excluding
same-sex couples from civil marriage. To be sure, the disestablishment of
civil marriage could impose its own equal protection injury if doing so were
motivated by a desire to deny same-sex couples a right to marry, just as
closing public schools created an equal protection injury when done to avoid
this Court’s command to end de jure racial segregation in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954): “[w]hatever nonracial grounds might
support a State’s allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object must
be a constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to desegregation
do not qualify as constitutional.” Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 377 U.S.
218, 231 (1964). But if the abolition of marriage were undertaken, as I urge
here, in sympathy with the equal protection rights of same-sex couples no
constitutional infirmity of the sort of the kind confronted by the Court in
Griffin would occur. Rather than a subterfuge to avoid compliance with the
constitution, the abolition of marriage would assure greater fidelity to the
constitution’s promises of equal treatment and dignity under law for all gay
men and lesbians.9
IV.
For these reasons, I concur in the Court’s conclusion that the laws at
issue here violate the Equal Protection Clause, but I do so for reasons other
than those marshaled by the CHIEF JUSTICE. Laws barring same-sex
couples from eligibility for licensure as civil marriages find their origin in and
perpetuate notions of heterosexual supremacy, and have the aim and effect of
imposing a badge of inferiority on gay men and lesbians more generally.
Furthermore, I seek to clarify the nature of the remedy that ought to be
ordered on remand. Given that the real parties in interest in this action
include all gay men and lesbians, the underlying values of equal protection
can only be served if the Court were to avoid a remedy that ameliorated one
form of inequality while simultaneously exacerbating yet another. For this
Constitutional scholars have described the cynical elimination of public benefits or
rights that is motivated by a larger interest in rights-avoidance as a kind of
“leveling-down,” whereas the remedy demanded by the petitioners herein requires
a kind of “leveling up,” the provision of a benefit to a previously excluded group. See
Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 Mich. L.
Rev. 2001, 2027-29 (1998). The remedy I suggest herein does not amount to a form
of “leveling down” insofar as the remedy seeks to advance the equal protection
rights of all members of the larger class with interests in this matter: gay men and
lesbians who suffer a status injury regardless of their marital status or desire to
formalize an intimate relationship.
9
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reason, the only remedy that would be equality-enhancing overall would be
one that disestablished the institution of civil marriage altogether. It would
then be left to the states to devise a more equitable means by which to secure
the economic and legal interests of its citizens; one that does not rest on
status hierarchies that run afoul of fundamental values of equality and
democracy.
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Comments on Obergefell Opinion
Katherine Franke
I joined Chief Justice Balkin’s opinion because I, like he, believe that state laws
that bar otherwise eligible same-sex couples from receiving civil marriage licenses
violate equal protection principles. But I chose to describe the equality injury somewhat
differently than he did.
Of course, the road to gaining marriage equality for same-sex couples could have
been achieve via a number of different routes. The Supreme Court’s approach in
Obergefell frames the issue as one that primarily implicates the liberty interests of the
petitioner-couples. In Lawrence, Windsor, and now Obergefell Justice Kennedy has been
the primary architect of a jurisprudence of liberty for lesbian and gay people. While I am
usually a big fan of liberty, Justice Kennedy’s version of liberty is too, well, liturgical for
my taste. The way in which he weaves a concept of liberty in these cases into a larger
theology of human dignity often times troubles me. It is the dignity of the bourgeois,
monogamous, respectable couple (a counterfactual premise in Lawrence, to be sure) that
has been unfairly humiliated by the state in Windsor and seeks the state’s blessing with a
civil marriage license in Obergefell.
By leveraging the “sweet mysteries of life” language of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”1), Justice Kennedy
announced an autonomy/liberty right of lesbian and gay people in Lawrence to be free
from criminal sanction (for sex that is between adults, consented to, and in private); in
Windsor to have their valid civil marriages recognized by the federal government; and in
Obergefell to enjoy the nobility, dignity and/or unique fulfillment of entering a marriage,
a universal human good arising from the most basic human needs and essential to our
most profound hopes and aspirations.2
Liberty got the job done of securing a constitutional norm protecting the rights of
(some) lesbian and gay people, but it did so in a way that lodged that norm in the value of
individual freedom. Thus the wrong that was remedied in these cases was one of
irrational, or even unfair, constraint on human action and agency. Necessary to
Kennedy’s reasoning was a celebration of the normative worlds from which lesbian and
gay people had been shut out: the dignified couple (Lawrence), preferential economic and
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legal status (Windsor), and the transcendent dignity and security of having the state
license one’s marriage.
Lost in the liberty analysis, however, is a sustained analysis of the origins of the
legal prohibitions or penalties challenged in these cases. I have always admired the
reasoning in Loving v. Virginia for Chief Justice Warren’s and Justice Stewart’s
willingness to call out Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law as “obviously an endorsement
of the doctrine of White Supremacy.”3 Not a problem of mere classification, not a
problem of “not treating like things alike,” not a failure of “color-blindness,” but an
endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy. Bam!
Only the use of a substantive equal protection analysis in Obergefell could isolate,
name, and condemn the underlying ideology of supremacy that barred same-sex couples
from civil marriage. This kind of constitutional inquiry would gain the right to marry for
the plaintiffs in this case, but would do so in a way that would deliver a more
generalizable rule that could be exported to other contexts where heterosexual
supremacy, or heterosexism, does its nasty work, and may indeed benefit future racial
and sexual equality cases. The gay rights movement has made good use of the
jurisprudence of racial and sexual equality as it fought for marriage equality, and I aimed
to devise a rule in Obergefell that would return the favor – strengthening the Court’s
equal protection reasoning in such a way that would be useful in other settings. Marriage
is merely one context where heterosexual supremacy is sutured into law and culture, and
I felt strongly that a win in Obergefell should not be on terms that cabined it in that
particular context.
For this reason I turned to an antisubordination equality principle in my opinion.
Reva Siegel has elegantly parsed the differences between anticlassification and
antisubordination approaches to the Equal Protection Clause,4 and this distinction
characterizes my motivation to write separately from Chief Justice Balkin in this case.
The additional virtues of an antisubordination approach, one that invests in an
anti-caste principle that aims to dismantle a status hierarchy, is that it avoids any
particular investment in the institution of civil marriage. When the Supreme Court found
that the City of Greenville, South Carolina’s law mandating the racial segregation of
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lunch counters5 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it
found no need to discuss the importance of lunch counters in the nation’s culinary
traditions or history. Rather, the Court focused on the racism that was entrenched in local
law.6
Given that I maintain a rather critical posture toward the institution of marriage
itself, and toward a gay rights movement strategy that elevated marriage rights to the top
of a civil rights agenda,7 I wanted to craft an opinion in Obergefell that would be more
about the evils of homophobic or heterosexism than it was about virtues of marriage. I
aimed to do that in three ways. First, as already discussed, I relied on an
antisubordination approach to equality. Second, I framed the stakes in the case as
implicating not just same-sex couples who sought to marry, but all lesbian and gay
people, a class that can be understood as the objects and negative beneficiaries of laws
and cultural norms that embrace heterosexual supremacy. Third, I affirmatively rejected
any finding that there was a substantive due process right to marriage or that marriage
was, by implication, a fundamental right.
Throughout all of the opinion I was careful to avoid arguments favored by Justice
Kennedy (and deployed to a lesser degree by Chief Justice Balkin) that celebrate the
dignity of the married couple. These arguments, in my view, purchase inclusion of samesex couples in the institution of marriage by disparaging life on marriage’s outside or
outside the conjugal couple, and have had the unfortunate effect of off-loading stigma
previously associated with gay families onto other non-normative families. It was
important to me to find a path for the plaintiffs to win that avoided an investment in
marriage itself.
Finally, my opinion sought to make clear that this case was about the civil
licensure of marriages, not the institution of marriage itself. Justice Kennedy’s opinion
for the Court in Obergefell collapsed these two notions of marriage, and did so to great
doctrinal and political expense. The institution of marriage as a religious bond, or one
that bound kinship units together through contract for daughters/wives preexisted the
state getting into the game by issuing civil marriage licenses. Mary Anne Case reminds
us that when the Crown first began to license marriages, “a marriage license could be
5
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seen to have functioned [] in ways loosely analogous to a modern dog license, as
something like a certificate of ownership of the wife, entitling the husband to her
property, her body and its products, including the labor she engaged in for wages and the
labor that produced offspring.”8 As such, the state’s entry into the marriage licensing
business is relatively recent, and its motivations for doing so were rather questionable
from the perspective of equality.
On balance, there is no good reason, to my mind, why the state is so deeply
involved in sanctioning certain kinship or conjugal partnerships and not others. In
Obergefell Justice Kennedy regrettably reaffirmed rather noxious language from
Maynard v. Hill, “Marriage, the Maynard Court said, has long been “‘a great public
institution, giving character to our whole civil polity.’” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. at
2601, quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 213 (1888). He then concluded, citing
historian Nancy Cott, that “[m]arriage remains a building block of our national
community.” Id. If this is true, it is so not as a matter of natural fact but as a
consequence of the legal and economic privilege we grant to the institution itself. I see
no justification, based in equality or otherwise, why the gay rights movement should
collaborate in the normalization of the unfortunate social reality that grants married
people a kind of status-based privilege not enjoyed by others who form partnerships or
family outside marriage or whose lives don’t take a marital or couple form at all.
For these reasons my opinion concludes by making a plea for the disestablishment
of the institution of marriage altogether. It strikes me as tragic that the constitutional
legibility of lesbians and gay men would be accomplished within a frame that not only
takes for granted, but actually fortifies, another form of status hierarchy, one that
privileges married people over unmarried people. Particularly given that I identify the
larger class of all gay men and lesbians as the real parties in interest in this case, I lament
a resolution of the case that “levels up” the plaintiff class (couples who would be eligible
for civil licensure but for the “same-sex” nature of their union) and confers on them the
privileges of membership in a superior class while leaving members of the lesbian and
gay community who do not desire or are ineligible for such status without the benefits of
these newly-gained constitutional protections.
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